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Social Dynamics and Nationhood in Employment Politics in the Trepça Mining Complex 
in Socialist Kosovo (1960s) 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses the interconnection of socio-economic divisions and nationhood in 
Socialist Kosovo through a case-study of employment politics in the Trepça mining complex 
during the 1960s. The article first describes the shifting cadre politics in Trepça, which aimed 
to increase the degree of skills of the work collective and to address the dramatic 
underrepresentation of Albanians in management and specialist positions. It then analyses the 
departure of Serb and Montenegrin specialists from the enterprise and the internal dispute over 
the proportional relevance of socio-economic and national grounds for this trend. The second 
half of the article situates these developments against two levels of social division in the 
enterprise: vertical social divisions between manual production workers and specialist cadres 
and horizontal divisions at the top management level. The article argues that the divisions 
between low-skilled production workers and management personnel was not politically 
relevant. Such vertical social divisions were depoliticised and denationalised. The outspoken 
national dimension of cadre politics for specialist personnel and the pluralist tendencies in the 
management culture of Yugoslav enterprises during the late 1960s, on the other hand, 
nationalised and politicised the competition between a new generation of Albanian technically 
schooled specialists and the predominantly Serb, politically appointed managers in function.  
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Introduction 
The interconnection of national and socio-economic divisions counts as a key destabilising 
factor of Socialist Yugoslavia. Most literature has focussed on the economic and national 
divergences between republics and provinces, which were rooted in the political and economic 
decentralisation of the 1960s and continued to burden the Yugoslav federation until its ultimate 
collapse (Jakir, 2013; Kežić, 2017, pp. 92–133; Pleština, 1992; Ramet, 2006, pp. 263–284; 
Unkovski-Korica, 2016, pp. 165–219; Woodward, 1995, pp. 352–367). An assessment of the 
relevance of nationhood in economically motivated social conflict at the level of the locality 
lacks.  
Employment is a particularly useful domain to analyse economically motivated social 
conflict. Referring to the post-Soviet space, Pål Kolstø (2008, esp. p. 152) states that population 
growth and job equalisation upset ethnically stratified systems and create socio-economically 
motivated ethnic division. The ethnic stratification of employment and demographic 
developments in Kosovo suggest that these conditions were met in Yugoslavia’s least 
developed region. Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented in the privileged public sector, 
while Albanians provided the bulk of the unemployed and the private sector (Ströhle, 2016b; 
Woodward, 1995, p.342). Kosovo’s population almost doubled in the three decades after the 
Second World War and witnessed significant changes in ethnic proportions, because of the 
boom of the Albanian population (Clewing, 2000, p. 51, pp.55–57). In the same period, state 
education was developed practically from scratch and by the early 1980s, Kosovo had the 
highest share of higher education students of all Yugoslav units (Kostovicova, 2005, pp. 40–
43; Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 289–362). Yugoslavia’s regional development policy guaranteed high 
funding priority for Kosovan industry despite underperformance and often limited economic 
justifications. Yet, the province remained the most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia 
(Palairet, 1992; Pleština, 1992). The stagnation of economic growth in the mid-1960s concurred 
with the graduation of the first generations of higher education students. Registered 
unemployment rates were the highest in Yugoslavia at over 25%, while the economically active 
population and the rate of employment were the lowest of the country, at 30 and 16% 
respectively (Woodward, 1995, pp. 200–208). 
The failure of Yugoslav socio-economic policy to employ the educated youth of Kosovo, an 
essential aspect of the failure of Kosovan socialist modernity, generated ethnically based 
political fault lines. Nearly full unemployment of Kosovo Albanians provided ‘the economic 
basis for an alternative community centred in family-based social organization and ethnically 
based political identities’ (Woodward, 1995, p. 342). In 1968 and 1981, Albanian students took 
to the streets of Pristina with a blend of socio-economic and national demands for equal access 
to education and public employment and political autonomy, indicating the mobilising force of 
Kosovo Albanian political identity (Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 335–60; Woodward, 1995, pp. 282–98, 
pp. 342–4). At the same time, censuses indicated a stagnation and then drop in the numbers of 
Serbs and Montenegrins in the province from the 1960s onwards. This trend has been ascribed 
to a combination of national and economic factors. Serbian historiography generally relates the 
emigration of Serbs from Kosovo to Albanian economic and political pressure, while Kosovo 
Albanian interpretations usually situate these developments within broader economic migration 
patterns (Clewing, 2000, pp. 58–59).  
In order to make a sensible contribution to the discussion over the relation between socio-
economic and national divisions in Socialist Kosovo, I take as a starting point Kolstø’s (2008) 
concluding claim that although socio-economic structures strongly influence nationalism, 
structure should not be favoured over agency (p. 167). I decrease the scale of analysis from the 
macro-level of republics and provinces to the locality, which was a crucial site of employment 
politics in the economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995, pp. 173–180).  
The article presents a thick analysis of social agency in the mining, metallurgy, and chemical 
industry enterprise of Trepça (Serbian: Trepča),1 with seat in multi-ethnic Mitrovica in northern 
Kosovo. Under British ownership in the interwar period, the historical mining site was 
reactivated at Stanterg (Serbian: Stari Trg), just east of Mitrovica, and expanded with 
processing, smelting, and refinery capacities in Zveqan (Serbian: Zvečan), north of Mitrovica. 
Trepça was further developed as a prime extraction site of lead for Nazi Germany during the 
Second World War. In Socialist Yugoslavia, the complex was integrated into a conglomerate 
for mining, metallurgical, and chemical industry, which was the top producer of lead and zinc 
in the country with a maximal employment of over 20,000 people. It was a typical example of 
a Yugoslav big system enterprise, with wasteful investments, oversizing, extensive production 
increase by expanding production sites and activities, low productivity performance, and 
disastrous profit records covered up by constant subsidisation from the federal development 
funds. Nevertheless, the enterprise has an iconic significance for the Serbs and Albanians of 
Kosovo as the province’s major natural economic asset and guarantee for well-being (Palairet, 
n.d., pp. 5–13). 
The enterprise has been the subject of Serb-Albanian dispute at least since the second half 
of the 1960s, when the departure of Serb experts initiated the discussion on national tensions in 
the province. Trepça re-emerged as a prominent site of ethno-political conflict in Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia as a whole in 1989, when Albanian miners in Stanterg struck against the suspension 
of Kosovo’s autonomy. The strikers gained the support of the Kosovo Albanian and Slovenian 
political leadership in their common battle against the centralisation politics of Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević. The post-1989 period was characterised by the massive 
dismissal and departure of Albanians from Trepça. The enterprise was on the verge of collapse 
when it was ultimately brought under United Nations administration in 1999 and closed down 
in August 2000 (Palairet, n.d., pp. 13–83). At current, Trepça is not operational, but the Serbian 
and Kosovan governments continue to lay claim on the enterprise.  
This study focusses on socio-economic and national divisions in the enterprise in the 1960s. 
In an early study, Wolfgang Höpken (1984) identified the second half of the 1960s as a period 
of pluralist challenges to the monistic systemic structure of Socialist Yugoslavia. Among the 
‘pluralist niches’, he identified labour divisions in the enterprise and the increasingly formalised 
strike phenomenon (pp. 231–281). Recent historical research on internal democratisation and 
conflict-management in self-managing enterprises has confirmed the rising social divergences 
in Yugoslav enterprises during the 1960s (Rutar, 2015; Schult, 2017, pp. 216–274; Suvin, 2016, 
pp. 180–205).  
Although the literature has provided sufficient evidence of increasingly open nationalist 
disputes at the level of the political and intellectual elites in the second half of the 1960s (Haug, 
2012, pp. 213–283; Ramet, 2006, pp. 285–324), the coincidence of national and socio-economic 
divisions has not been studied at the micro-level of the enterprise. A rare business history of 
industrial development in Socialist Kosovo in the Ramiz Sadiku automotive supply factory in 
Peja (Serbian: Peć) argues that ‘ethnic jealousy’ posed an additional obstacle for the functioning 
of the enterprise (Palairet, 1992, p. 909). Apart from references to violent disturbances in the 
late 1960s, ‘probably of an interethnic nature’, and ‘almost certainly intentional’ obstruction of 
Serb qualified personnel in the chronically underqualified factory, the study, however, fails to 
provide a detailed account of how this actually worked (Palairet, 1992, p. 903). This study aims 
to fill this gap. It is based on in-depth research of the local and enterprise newspapers, relevant 
archival sources in Belgrade and Mitrovica, and a series of semi-structured interviews 
conducted by the author with former workers of Trepça during extended periods in July and 
October 2017 and March 2018.  
 
Employment politics in Trepça: Between national proportionality and technical expertise 
In the 1960s, Trepça undertook an ambitious programme of modernisation and expansion. The 
economic reforms of the early 1960s transformed the enterprise into a conglomerate of mines 
and processing factories. The Kombinat integrated all zinc and lead mines in the Republic of 
Serbia, most of which were located in Kosovo. It also invested in new metallurgic processing 
factories and chemical industry. Against this background, the shortage of skilled labour in the 
enterprise was a continuous concern. Table 1 shows that in 1960, more than 50% of all 
production workers were semi- or unskilled, which implied that they were without any 
vocational training. What is more, among over 6,000 production workers, only 441 were high-
qualified. The entire enterprise counted only 86 university-schooled specialists.2  
Table 1 – Composition of the work collective of Trepça in Kosovo3 
 Qualification Year Albanian4   Serb Montenegrin Other Total5 
B
lu
e-
co
ll
ar
 w
o
rk
er
s 
High-Qualified 
(specialisation) 
1960 83 18,82% 297 67,35% 33 7,48% 28 441 6,38% 
1967 411 31,69% 788 60,76% 56 4,32% 42 1297 14,81% 
1970 512 35,19% 801 55,05% 81 5,57% 61 1455 15,24% 
Qualified 
(vocational 
school) 
1960 785 37,70% 1126 54,08% 96 4,61% 75 2082 30,10% 
1967 1500 54,31% 1329 48,12% 66 2,39% 67 2762 31,53% 
1970 1839 54,90% 1378 41,13% 74 2,21% 59 3350 35,09% 
Semi-qualified  
(elementary 
school) 
1960 1381 64,47% 643 30,02% 53 2,47% 65 2142 30,97% 
1967 1646 64,91% 803 31,66% 25 0,99% 62 2536 28,95% 
1970 1524 62,69% 836 34,39% 19 0,78% 32 2431 25,46% 
Unqualified (no 
education) 
1960 696 43,94% 793 50,06% 6 0,38% 89 1584 22,90% 
1967 576 67,45% 255 29,86% 4 0,47% 16 854 9,75% 
1970 487 51,26% 423 44,53% 21 2,21% 19 950 9,95% 
W
h
it
e-
co
ll
ar
 w
o
rk
er
s 
University 1960 5 5,81% 64 74,42% 7 8,14% 10 86 1,24% 
1967 24 9,23% 186 71,54% 34 13,08% 16 260 2,97% 
1970 34 15,18% 138 61,61% 37 16,52% 15 224 2,35% 
High school, 
gymnasium or 
trade school 
1960 6 23,08% 13 50,00% 4 15,38% 3 26 0,38% 
1967 25 17,73% 91 64,54% 28 19,86% 3 141 1,61% 
1970 50 23,58% 122 57,55% 26 12,26% 8 212 2,22% 
Full elementary 
school (8 years) 
1960 11 4,28% 193 75,10% 40 15,56% 13 257 3,72% 
1967 68 12,08% 406 72,11% 66 11,72% 23 563 6,43% 
1970 170 23,58% 469 65,05% 58 8,04% 24 721 7,55% 
Unqualified 1960 32 10,74% 199 66,78% 43 14,43% 24 298 4,31% 
1967 55 15,90% 239 69,08% 43 12,43% 9 346 3,95% 
1970 42 20,59% 115 56,37% 36 17,65% 11 204 2,14% 
 Total 1960 2999 43,36% 3328 48,12% 282 4,08% 307 6916  
1967 4108 46,90% 4017 45,86% 316 3,61% 238 8759  
1970 4664 48,85% 4302 45,06% 352 3,69% 229 9547   
 
Due to the absence of technical higher education in Kosovo up to the early 1960s, the 
enterprise had to bring in engineers and technicians from outside the region. In fact, this trend 
dated from the interwar period, when Trepça hired engineers and expertise from Britain and 
more developed parts of Yugoslavia. Engineers who were trained in the more developed 
northwest of Yugoslavia also took the lead in the reconstruction process in the first post-war 
decade. From the mid-1950s, Serbs and Montenegrins schooled in Belgrade began to dominate 
the management, while engineers from the more developed parts of Yugoslavia returned to their 
home regions.6 
Specialists were attracted with financial and extra-financial privileges. In line with the 
symbolic and economic importance of mining in Socialist Yugoslavia, employees of Trepça 
generally enjoyed income that doubled the local standards. Yet, on top of this, specialists 
received incomes that surpassed the ‘illogical proportion’ of 10:1 compared to those of manual 
workers.7 Such wage differentiation measures to attract specialists created social unrest 
(workers apparently pasted banknotes on the walls of the factories in protest against the award 
system for specialists) and ‘strong frontal resistance from the [Communist League] committee, 
trade union, and workers’ council’.8  
Trepça also allocated large sums for the construction of modern apartment buildings and 
provided loans for the building of private individual houses. By the early 1970s, the enterprise 
financed more than 3,000 flats and over 900 alone-standing houses in the Mitrovica area.9 As 
in other Yugoslav enterprises (Schult, 2017, pp. 188–193), the distribution of flats was based 
on a points system, which prioritised high-qualified workers. The granting of credit was 
conditioned on own contribution, which again favoured qualified workers with higher 
incomes.10 Interviews confirm that engineers and doctors were the primary beneficiaries of the 
urban development of the city.  
In the early 1960s, a policy shift took place toward training local Kosovan technical 
specialists. The first technical high schools in Kosovo were opened in Mitrovica and Pristina in 
1961–62. Trepça provided scholarships to students.11 The underrepresentation of Albanians in 
skilled labour was a related policy theme. Local authorities noted that although 70% of the total 
workforce were Albanian, they comprised less than 10% of the high-qualified workers.12 From 
the mid-1960s, the provincial leadership paid increased attention to proportional representation 
of the nationalities at expert and management positions in enterprises.13 The Brioni Plenum of 
July 1966 was a major catalyst in this process. Mostly remembered as the final stage of an 
internal power struggle between liberal decentralists and conservative centralists within the 
Yugoslav League of Communists, the Plenum identified discriminatory practices against 
Kosovo Albanians as one of the major ‘deformations’ of the conservative and centralist wing 
of the party and state apparatus (Petranović & Zečević, 1988, p. 1109, pp. 1112–1125; Ströhle, 
2016, pp. 246–258, pp. 298–334). 
Post-Brioni discussions in Mitrovica revealed and openly discussed violations and 
discriminatory practices against Albanian workers in Trepça.14 The municipal party committee 
found that the Serb-dominated cadre department (kadrovska služba) did not accept application 
letters in Albanian and withheld Albanian students who had received a scholarship. Positive 
legal measures for improving the national composition of the management were not 
implemented.15 Workers’ assemblies and party meetings in the enterprise criticised the cadre 
department as particularly inefficient, corrupt, and discriminatory.16 In a typical gesture of self-
criticism, the cadre department recognised that employment had often been a case of 
connections and bureaucratic interference. The ongoing transfer of employment competences 
to the workers’ self-management organs, however, would address this issue. As for the national 
composition of the work collective, illiteracy courses and scholarship programmes would 
improve the qualification of the Albanian workers.17   
The Party’s ideological starting point that nationalism was redundant in developed socio-
economic structures and that quality should always have priority over nationality, however, 
provided possibilities to block proportional representation of Albanians in management cadres 
and pertain Serb domination because of Albanian underqualification.18 The cadre department 
justified Serb overrepresentation in management as followed:  
The needs of the enterprise required that specialist cadres be secured from various parts 
of the country, and thus the recruitment of specialists mostly involved Serbs and 
Montenegrin specialists.19 The unfavourable start and the lack of elementary education 
among members of nationalities [Albanians and Turks, P.T.] hindered their education 
and specialist training, which obstructed faster changes in the national structure of 
workers from the ranks of the nationalities.20  
In a similar line of reasoning, Miljan Petrušić, a leading local Communist and manager in 
Trepça, criticised chauvinist practices to employ Serbs at management positions when there 
were sufficient qualified Albanian cadres. However, he added the important reservation that 
there was a lack of qualified Albanian cadres and that quality should have priority over 
nationality, which in practice implied that there mostly was no other choice than to employ Serb 
and Montenegrin specialists.21  
The cadre department provided a detailed analysis of the structure of the work collective and 
pointed to improvements in terms of qualification and national composition (see table 1). For 
both blue- and white-collar workers, by 1967, the number of qualified workers increased in 
absolute and relative numbers. The number of un- or semiskilled production workers dropped 
from more than 50% in 1960 to around 39%, while the number of high-skilled workers more 
than doubled to almost 15%. The number of specialists with university degrees increased from 
86 to 260.     
In terms of national composition, the share of Albanians increased, as part of the total work 
collective and the population of qualified workers. The national composition of the blue-collar 
workers roughly corresponded to the national composition of the general population in the 
region, but the proportion of Serbs notably increased for skilled workers. For white-collar 
workers, the national disproportion remained outspoken. In the category of experts with 
university degrees, the share of Albanians was 9% against 71% Serbs. The share of Albanian 
in management positions increased from 16 to 30%, while the share of Serbs dropped from 67 
to 56%.22 The Central Workers’ Council initiated an ambitious programme to reach ‘a faster 
solution for the cadre problematics, taking into consideration more adequate structural relations 
between nationalities.’23 The plan did not set numerical targets, but stated that the national 
composition of the work collective should reflect the composition of the population.24 In 
selection procedures for scholarships or employment, members of underrepresented 
nationalities received priority in case of equal qualifications.25 A new regulation on bilingual 
administration prescribed that all workers of Trepça had the right to communicate in their own 
language and that all enterprise documents should be set in Albanian and Serbo-Croatian.26 For 
this purpose, bilingual administrative job positions and a translation unit were created.27  
 
The ‘exodus’ of specialists: National or economic emigration? 
As in Yugoslavia as a whole (Schult, 2017, pp. 206–216), labour turnover posed a tremendous 
problem in Trepça. In 1966, turnover jumped from 12% to 20–25% of the total labour 
population. For high-qualified workers, there was even a negative balance, while open and 
countrywide vacancies in the major Serbian- and Albanian-language newspapers failed to 
attract applicants.28 In 1968 and the first months of 1969, 336 specialists left Trepça, including 
70 from managerial positions. Most were engineers and technicians or high-skilled production 
workers. The absolute majority of them left factories in Mitrovica.29 Even considering the 
disproportionally high share of Serb and Montenegrin specialists with university degrees, the 
number of Serbs and Montenegrins was out of proportion.  
 
Table 2 – Emigration of qualified workers from Trepça, 1968–first months of 196930 
 Qualification Serbs Albanians Montenegrins Others Total 
Blue-
collar 
High-Qualified 41 11 5 4 61 
Qualified  67 28 6 11 112 
White-
collar 
University 47 4 16 6 73 
Secondary school 20 3 6 3 32 
Full elementary school 32 14 9 3 58 
 Total 207 60 42 27 336 
 
What were the reasons for this development? The cadre department suggested that both push 
and pull factors were relevant. It called for measures to make the position of specialists more 
attractive (increased wage and promotion opportunities) but also energetic action against ‘lack 
of discipline, negligence, anarchy, irresponsible use of means of production, and, especially, an 
incorrect and primitive relation towards specialised cadres’, which apparently made the position 
of specialists difficult.31  
The most sensitive question was whether national tensions played a structural role. The 
official argumentation of the League of Communists was that the structural background for the 
emigration was the underdevelopment of the region, which resulted in economic difficulties for 
enterprises, relatively low wages, and limited opportunities for promotion and further 
qualification. In addition, self-management was not yet properly developed, leading to flawed 
income distribution mechanisms, bureaucratic tendencies in cadre politics, ‘an artisan and 
peasant-like primitivistic mentality’ of resistance against specialists, and hooliganism. Against 
this background, nationalist extremists on both sides destabilised the situation and created 
discord (Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 330–333).32  
However, opinions differed in the Party. In May 1968, Dobrica Ćosić was expelled from the 
Serbian League of Communists for arguing that rising Albanian chauvinism caused the 
emigration of Serb experts (Gatalović, 2014, pp. 332–333, pp. 339–345; Ristanović, 2012). 
Within the provincial committee of the League of Communists, Miloš Sekulović and Jovo Šotre 
crossed the official line of argumentation when they related the emigration of Serb and 
Montenegrin specialists to an organised Albanian nationalist attack against the political order 
in Kosovo. They also questioned the nationalities policy in Kosovo after the Brioni Plenum, 
arguing that it had led to Albanian majorisation and job insecurity among Serbs and 
Montenegrins. They gave examples of employment based on nationality only and absurd 
demands for bilingualism in job descriptions.33   
In early 1969, a number of newspapers from Pristina and Belgrade picked up the news of the 
emigration of specialists from Trepça. They interviewed General Director Časlav Živković, 
who related the departure of experts to their unclear status, the lack of perspective, and the 
relatively low incomes. When the journalists raised the national element, Živković replied that 
this question was treated simplistically and with unnecessary nervousness. However, he 
cryptically recognised that the affirmative politics for establishing national equality after 1966 
had led to ‘certain excesses’. On the one side (Živković doesn’t state which but he clear means 
the Albanian), there was no respect for post-war achievements and the self-sacrificing efforts 
of engineers in difficult conditions. Excessive insistence to change the entire cadre overnight, 
regardless of technological and qualitative capacities, had led to some ‘precedents’ and 
Albanian chauvinist attacks, which caused nervousness, fear, and insecurity. On the other – 
Serbian – side, there was reactionary resistance against the affirmative measures to promote 
national equality in the enterprise. ‘In that way, the noble socialist principle of equality of 
nations and nationalities has turned in its own reverse – in direct confrontation on national 
relations.’34    
Also in February 1969, the Central Workers’ Council adopted a strategy for cadre policies, 
which aimed to address the shortage of specialists in mining and metallurgy and get rid of the 
surplus of almost 2,000 unskilled workers by 1970. The enterprise set up an ambitious 
scholarship programme, which gave priority to Albanian students in particular.35 However, the 
positive discrimination of Albanians in selection procedures for the employment of specialists 
was revoked. Živković and the central cadre department recognised that the national 
composition of specialist cadres did not yet reflect the population structure, but noted that the 
transition would be a long-term endeavour, which could not come at the expense of the general 
technological progress of the enterprise.36 This policy change addressed reported excesses 
where national proportionality had received priority over expertise and was an obvious 
countermeasure to stall the emigration of Serb and Montenegrin specialists. It can also be 
interpreted as a Serb national reaction against increased employment of Albanian specialists, 
under the guise of the Communist dictum that expertise should always outweigh nationhood.  
The Central Workers’ Council came out divided on the issue. The Albanian President of the 
Workers’ Council, Fadilj Mumini, and some prominent other Albanian delegates argued that 
the departure of specialists was part of ongoing fluctuation patterns and economic and 
individual decisions.37 Talks about national pressure were tendentious and harmful for the 
collective. Some Serb delegates in the council, on the other hand, insisted that ‘national 
intolerance was one of the reasons why people are leaving the enterprise’. This provoked a 
fierce reaction from Mumini against  
the conclusion that the Albanian nation exerts pressure on others. If such a decision is taken 
here, I can say here and now that I would consider to resign and to return my party booklet. 
I cannot agree that the Albanian nation is blemished, when it is not the case.’38 
At the same session, the enterprise journal organised an anonymous questionnaire asking the 
delegates for their opinion on the matter. Four mutually non-exclusive lines of reasoning came 
out. A first group of answers referred to a lack of loyalty and work ethics among specialists. 
The specialists that left came from outside of the region and were only interested in making a 
lot of money in a short time. They were selfish in general, not eager to work, and quarrelsome. 
This particularly applied to young specialists, who lacked any sense of loyalty to the enterprise. 
A second group blamed the collective for a lack of respect for specialists, as expressed in the 
low wages, obstruction to the hiring of young specialists, and hostility from the part of the direct 
producers, including physical threats and insults. A third argument referred to the economic 
difficulties in Trepça, which limited the prospects for specialists and kept wages low. In 
addition, broader fluctuation patterns in Yugoslavia saw specialists moving from the industry 
to easier and better-paid jobs in banks and institutions. The fourth group of answers pointed to 
nationalist tensions and job insecurity, in particular after instances where Albanians replaced 
Serbian specialists. In Mitrovica in particular, it was said, national relations were omnipresent 
and interfered in every possible discussion.39  
The League of Communists, itself increasingly dominated by specialist cadres and managers 
(Schult, 2017, pp. 239–243; Suvin, 2016, pp. 129–39; Woodward, 1995, pp. 322–325), 
prioritised the second line of reasoning and activated its membership to promote a correct 
position toward specialists. Fatmir Agolli, one of the first Albanian engineers and at the time 
director of the smelter and refinery, said that ‘the relation towards specialist cadres at all levels 
in Trepça is extremely bad, which has an impact on the fluctuation of cadres’. He referred to 
low wages, the lack of prospects for promotion and specialisation, and ungrateful job 
requirements. Dušan Šurbatović of the Stanterg mine referred to ‘groups of non-workers who 
try to create unrest and divisions and distrust within the collective’. He warned:  
If I were forty, I would leave if I could, although I was born here. I have many reasons 
for that. They threaten me directly and indirectly. The worker threatens me and says that 
he will kill me. For my son to see a brighter day.  
Deputy General Director Radovan Manojlović spoke of a gap between specialists and direct 
producers and testified that it was impossible to carry out management tasks in the current 
atmosphere. Svetozar Ćamilović, the director of the chemical industry factory, referred the 
production problems, apathy, and the lack of discipline, which led to the departure of cadres.40 
Although the accuracy of these statements cannot be taken at face value and is impossible to 
verify, they all indicate a wide gap between the management personnel and the production 
workers in the enterprise.  
The national element was not completely absent in the discussion, but seemed to be primarily 
connected to employment at the management level. The communists in the enterprise were 
tasked to intervene against ‘unhealthy occurrences where individuals and informal and 
uninvited groups evaluate and demand a change of the national structure of certain management 
cadres’ without taking into consideration expertise.41 Duško Vukosavljević, representative of 
the communist party organisation in Trepça, felt obliged to assure ‘journalists and comrades’ 
that cadre positions in Trepça were not closed for any nation and denounced the oft-heard claim 
that Croatian, Serbian, or Montenegrin cadres were not able to get employed in Trepça.42 
Rather than taking a direct position in this discussion, the remainder of this article will 
contextualise the discussion against broader social dynamics in the enterprise. In the late 1960s, 
divisions increased between function- and skill-based groups in the enterprise, as all over 
Yugoslavia (Allcock, 2000, pp. 188–90; Schult, 2017, pp. 243–257; Suvin, 2016, pp. 52–71, p. 
255). The discussions sketched above suggest that these divisions could potentially take a 
national character in Trepça at two levels.  
First, the gap between Serb-dominated specialist and management elites and the large, 
predominantly Albanian group of unskilled production workers could obtain a national tone. It 
is a common feature in global coalfield history that migration of skilled labour leads to the 
coincidence of ethnic division with divisions of skill and hierarchy (Knotter, 2015, p. 39). In 
Trepça, divisions of skill and hierarchy potentially overlapped with divisions of origin and 
ethnicity between the “imported” elite of Serb and Montenegrin engineers and managers and 
the “local” predominantly – but not exclusively – Albanian workforce. Second, positive 
discrimination measures could lead to excesses at the management level, as when Serb or 
Montenegrin cadres were denied employment through direct (Albanian directors only hired 
Albanian specialists) and indirect discrimination (Albanian-language requirements and 
outvoting on national basis).43  
In what follows, I will analyse the interconnection of national and socio-economic divisions 
in Trepça in more detail at these two levels. I will first look at vertical divisions between the 
large majority of un- and semiskilled workers and specialist cadres and then turn to horizontal 
divisions at the management level.  
 
Managing a hostile shop floor 
As part of the ongoing liberal economic policy to establish internationally competitive 
enterprises, firms were authorised to strengthen management autonomy to reduce production 
and labour costs and raise the skill credentials of the work collective (Woodward, 1995, pp. 
272–273). The resulting social unrest widened the gap between production workers and 
management elites in the enterprise. Manual workers increasingly retreated from official self-
management organs, opting for informal channels to express their grievances (Höpken, 1984, 
pp. 231–281; Rutar, 2015; Schult, 2017, pp. 152–236, pp. 255–272; Suvin, 2016, pp. 253–263). 
Facing limited return on investment and failed production plans, the Trepça management 
took measures to cut labour costs. Over halfway through 1967, the Central Workers’ Council 
rejected the financial plans that had been adopted by the workers’ councils at the level of the 
individual factories. It particularly criticised irrational income distribution, which showed a 
tendency of linear increases of personal income, regardless of failed realisations of production 
plans.44 The management board, the executive organ of the workers’ council where the General 
Director had a seat and a particularly strong influence, imposed a decrease of the planned 
personal income. Živković clarified that this had come as a shock, because there was a general 
idea that ‘lead was pouring’ in Trepça and that income would never fall below plan.45  
Social unrest against managerial interventions rose. Management organs constantly 
criticised so-called subjective resistance against the economic reforms: lack of discipline, 
sabotage, negligent use of enterprise goods, insubordination and refusal to carry out work tasks, 
demagogic appearances, and threats against specialists and managers. It came to ‘negative 
events’ under the leadership of ‘non-workers and vandals’ (‘neradnici i izgrednici’).46 In 
September 1969, for example, a group of workers, including Communist League members, laid 
down work in the smelter and approached the director and factory secretary of the League of 
Communists to demand the distribution of income surplus among all workers.47 Seven 
troublemakers were dismissed.48 In the mine of Stanterg, the Communists were forced to 
intervene against a decision of the Workers’ Council to pay out full personal incomes, although 
production had been only realised by 41,7%.49 Interviewed workers of the Stanterg mine 
recalled that so-called work stoppages over questions of wages and nutrition were frequent, but 
typically lasted only for a couple of hours and were quickly resolved with promises of food 
coupons or slight wage increases.  
The evaluation of the cadre strategy in 1970 showed that the numbers of qualified labour 
had increased only minimally. The number of specialists with university degrees even dropped, 
while that of unskilled new workers and workers who occupied a position for which they were 
not qualified increased (see table 1).50 In the smelter and refinery, for example, only one 
engineer remained in place. Two others had left and one moved to an administrative position, 
reportedly because of the bad atmosphere on the shop floor.51 The general management took 
wage differentiation measures to address the situation. It first introduced a 7–8% linear increase 
of the aggregate income to cover increased living costs. In addition, however, the business 
board (new name for the management board) recognised that the wages for specialists were not 
sufficient to attract them to come working in Mitrovica. It therefore suggested an additional 
differential increase of wages for specialists of 4–5%. The higher wage costs for specialists 
were compensated by cutting on socio-financial benefits for the workers, such as paid 
holidays.52 The general management also recentralised cadre politics in order to inhibit ‘narrow-
minded’ and ‘sectarian’ excesses of decentralisation. In the smelter, the general director was 
authorised to take all required measures to appoint specialist cadres.53 
The Central Workers’ Council opened an unrestricted job announcement for specialists (no 
experience required) and provided scholarships to all students of mining, metallurgy, and 
technology in Kosovo.54 New General Director Božidar Radunović, who replaced Živković 
after the latter moved to Belgrade in April 1970,55 promoted Trepça as an excellent place for 
young specialists to gain experiences. Beside good payment, the enterprise offered flats and a 
secured job for partners. Radunović also clarified that Trepça strove to have a nationally 
proportional work collective, but that the invitations to apply were directed to all nationalities 
and that skills were more important than nationality. Trepça also introduced cadre bonusses to 
attract specialists with higher wages.56 The dramatic response to the open vacancy – only 15 
inexperienced specialists accepted the offer – confirmed that the financial and extra-financial 
conditions at Trepça were not competitive. In order to solve the cadre problem in the long run, 
Trepça cofounded a new faculty for metallurgy in Mitrovica, which started operating in 1970–
71 as a branch of the Technical Faculty in Pristina and from 1974–75 as an independent 
faculty.57 
At the same time as it introduced wage differentiation measures for specialists, the general 
management intervened against the discrepancy between personal incomes and the actual 
production results and introduced wage cuts.58 There were also problems with payment of 
income. In May 1970, for example, the bank accounts of the smelter and refinery factory were 
blocked, which resulted in delays in income payment.59 The combination of bonuses for 
specialists and wage cuts for the manual workers caused resentment at the shop floor. In 
October 1971, the miners of Lece, near Medveđa in southern Serbia, stopped work against a 
decision to introduce a cadre bonus of 20%. The political leadership and management quickly 
intervened and reduced the number of specialist who would receive bonuses.60 On 18 February 
1971, thirty workers dropped work at the smelter and refinery. The strike lasted for an entire 
day – which was relatively long for Yugoslav standards – and had dramatic economic 
consequences, because it put the furnace out of operation for 45 days (Pushkolli, 1977, p. 316). 
The elements of politicisation in the strike were particularly unusual: Communist members 
were among the leaders of the strike, there had been attempts to spread the strike to the Stanterg 
mine and the zinc electrolysis factory, and there had been political agitation against high 
political representatives. 
The direct reason for the strike was a delay in the payment of personal income and rumours 
that the personal income would go down. The League of Communists directly addressed the 
complaints and guaranteed advance payment of the personal incomes. However, the workers 
also had more structural complaints against perceived privileges for specialists. Workers’ 
assemblies held after the strike criticised the systematisation of working places (which often 
implied that workers were transferred to positions for which they were qualified but with lower 
start incomes) and questioned the payment and other privileges of ‘coffee-drinking’ and 
‘travelling’ specialists.61 Director Slobodan Kočović defended the specialists, arguing that they 
did make considerable contributions to production. It was the collective, which was not 
sufficiently trained to realise their tasks. Kočović found it worrying that the workers were not 
self-critical, as there was no mentioning of theft, fights, and the enormous lack of discipline at 
the shop floor.62  
 
Nationhood and vertical unrest 
The cadre politics clearly exacerbated social divisions between specialist cadres and the large 
majority of semi- or unskilled production workers in Trepça. Although there was ethnic 
disproportion in Trepça – Albanians were badly underrepresented among skilled production 
workers and qualified white-collar workers, while for Serbs the opposite counts – the available 
sources suggest that nationhood was less relevant as a category of practice to make sense of 
divisions of skill and migration. At the workers’ assemblies held in the wake of the strike of 
1971, only two national comments were made by Albanian foremen, who called for 
prioritisation of Albanians in employment and expressed dissatisfaction with the appointment 
of five Serb foremen.63 The apparent absence of nationhood in reports on social unrest from 
below does not tell so much about the national consciousness of the workers or the relevance 
of national divisions in social unrest from below. This is a question, which remains difficult to 
assess with the available sources and the distortive hindsight of ethno-political conflict in 
Kosovo since the 1980s.  
It does tell us that any sign of national division in social unrest from below was defused and 
depoliticised. Director Kočović did not dwell upon the demand for national proportionality at 
the workers’ assemblies after the 1971 strike, but briefly noted that this was not the current 
practice and that such measures had to be discussed in the collective.64 In reporting to the 
provincial committee, the leading local political functionary Bahri Oruqi noted with satisfaction 
that national division was no motive behind the strike of 1971.65 One of the Albanian miners, 
whom I interviewed, recalled how he had once asked for an Albanian translation of the 
development plan, which was under discussion at the workers’ assembly. His question was 
clearly unusual. He stressed several times that he had first asked permission to pose the question 
and the meeting was paused as political functionaries withdrew en petit comité to discuss the 
issue. Translation was assured for next time. Such a practice is part of the broader policy of 
Socialist Yugoslavia toward social unrest. As the social question had been officially solved, the 
slightest sign of social unrest was immediately dealt with by small concessions to the workers 
and was consecutively marginalised, individualised, and depoliticised (Rutar, 2015, pp. 286–
287; Woodward, 1995, pp. 320–339). The same argument can be made for elements of national 
division in social unrest from below.   
This also explains the limited durability of these social and potentially national upheavals in 
the collective memory of the enterprise and city. Whereas dissatisfaction from below was 
relatively prominent in the contemporary press, none of my interviews with managers and 
workers from Trepça recalled any particularities about social unrest in the period – it is blurred 
together in an undefined series of work stoppages of very limited relevance. Of course, nostalgia 
for better times and lost dignity and modernity in Socialist Yugoslavia, which I encountered in 
my interviews with pensioned miners, in spite of Albanian national narratives of Serb 
oppression, interfere here in minimalizing the degree of social dissatisfaction (Petrović, 2010). 
I would argue, however, that the fact that instances of social unrest among the local Albanian 
unskilled labour against Serb-dominated and imported cadres are not appropriated as a resource 
to historicise the current ethno-political division of Trepça, Mitrovica, and Kosovo goes back 
to and confirms the successful depoliticization of social and national vertical unrest in Socialist 
Yugoslavia’s socio-economic policy.  
This becomes even more apparent when compared to the politicisation and nationalisation 
of social strikes in the political context of the late 1980s (Cvek, Ivčić, & Račić, 2015; Mušić, 
2016). As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, elements of socio-economic dissatisfaction over low and 
belated payments are forgotten and the series of strikes at Stanterg of 1988–90 is narrowed 
down to one iconic strike for Albanian national autonomy against Serbian authoritarianism and 
the violent and authoritarian Serbian reaction against it (Palairet, n.d., pp. 14–15). 
 
Competition at the top management level 
Diverging social interests also emerged at the top management level. The Central Workers’ 
Council was the scene for many of these divisions. Although theoretically the final decision-
making organ of the self-managing enterprise and the representative organ of the work 
collective, the workers’ council in practice served as a proxy for management cadres with 
increasingly diverging interests. First, directors, who did not have the right to vote in the 
council, but usually attended meetings, steered the work of the council through the management 
board, where they had a seat. Although the management board in theory executed decisions 
taken by the council, the practice often went the other way (Schult, 2017, pp. 34–35, pp. 61–
65; Suvin, 2016, pp. 189–190; Županov, 1985, pp. 129–152). 
The economic reforms of 1965 strengthened the competences of the self-management organs 
in the appointment and evaluation of directors in an attempt to professionalise the management. 
Up to then, the appointment of directors had been a political-administrative affair with no 
involvement of the workers’ councils. The reforms introduced obligatory re-election of 
directors and urged the workers’ councils to evaluate the managerial and technical expertise of 
the directors. The workers’ council could itself nominate new candidates.66 This concurred with 
rising competition between technically-schooled and politically-appointed managers. The focus 
on qualification and skills in the economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia entitled the new 
generation of technically schooled cadres higher social status, wage rate, and social benefits 
(housing) based on their qualifications. These schooled specialists increasingly challenged the 
position of the older generation of political cadres (Rutar, 2015, p. 282; Suvin, 2016, pp. 239–
244; Woodward, 1995, pp. 319–320; Županov, 1985, pp. 291–323).  
Beside the professional management, the enterprise branches of the League of Communist 
and the trade union served as parallel decision-making factors. The enterprise organisation of 
the League of Communists often determined the agenda of the self-management organs. It did 
not hesitate to intervene in case decisions were not in line with party regulations (Allcock, 2000, 
pp. 192–193; Suvin, 2016, p. 187, Woodward, 1995, pp. 322–325). The League of Communists 
also had the last word on the appointment of management, although this role was put in question 
in the period under scrutiny. My interviews suggest that technically schooled managers were 
member of the LCY, but not politically active, indicating relative distance to the core group of 
Communist decision-makers in the enterprise and municipality.   
Although initially conceived as a transmission belt of party politics, especially in the late 
1960s, the trade union profiled itself as the protector of workers’ self-management against 
managerial encroachment. In this capacity, it criticised the LCY in its role as ‘a craft union of 
managers and politicians’ (Woodward, 1995, p. 273, pp. 325–327, quotation on p. 325; see also 
Höpken, 1984, pp. 160–187, pp. 209–221; Pushkolli, 1977, pp. 286–317). However, this not 
necessarily meant that the trade union represented the collective interests of the workers against 
the elite. The trade union preserved the authority of the workers’ council and its own right to 
nominate candidates for the council (Woodward, 1995, p. 326). 
Finally, in the particular case of conglomerate enterprises like Trepça, the central workers’ 
council consisted of delegates of the workers’ councils at the level of the individual factories. 
An interviewed top manager stated that highest management cadres of the sections made sure 
that ‘their’ workers’ councils nominated delegates to the central workers’ council that were 
easy to influence. As such, the council was a platform for broader conflicts between 
increasingly competitive and autonomous constituent factories of conglomerate enterprises 
(Schult, 2017, pp. 72–80). 
In the unprecedented and unequalled liberalism of the late 1960s, these various interest 
groups—central management, factory managements, political and technically schooled 
managers, socio-political organisations—engaged in an increasingly pluralist management 
culture. A first point of division concerned the correct implementation of self-management. The 
first managerial interventions of 1967 in income distribution not only caused informal 
resistance from below. The Central Workers’ Council accepted the interventions, but held the 
general director and two of his deputies accountable for violating self-management 
regulations.67 The main criticism came from the trade union, which even called for the removal 
of managers for failing to respect self-management decisions.68 In an interview with the local 
newspaper Zvečan, the President of the trade union, Shefqet Jashari, presented the trade union 
as the driving force behind workers’ self-management in the enterprise, against ‘convulsive’ 
resistance from the management itself. From this point of view, Jashari criticised the managerial 
interventions, which showed that for ‘one group of managers, self-management is only a word 
on paper?’ Jashari also reproached the League of Communists for being passive and indifferent 
to the demands of the workers.69 At the same time, gossips circulated in the enterprise that 
Živković had over a million dinars in foreign exchange at a Swiss bank and there were frequent 
paroles to fire the general director. Allegedly, the gossips were spread by provincial 
functionaries in the trade union, whose names circulated as possible successors to Živković.70  
The municipal and provincial leadership of the League of Communists had to intervene. At 
an extraordinary meeting in Trepça, Veli Deva and Fadilj Hoxha, two prominent leaders of the 
Partisan generation of Kosovo Albanian Communists, paid lip service to the criticism against 
managerial encroachments of self-management, but said that resignations would not solve 
anything. The trade union’s generalising criticism against directors only created divisions in the 
work collective and in fact amounted to a lack of responsibility and ‘fake avant-gardism’.71 
Jashari had to agree that the criticism of the trade union had been too sharp, but repeated that 
the work collective had not been sufficiently informed and included in decision-making. He 
added that the national structure in the enterprise was bad, introducing the element of national 
proportionality to his criticism of the management. Časlav Živković recognised that he had 
overruled the irrational income distribution decisions taken by the self-management organs and 
added that he would do the same again ‘because … we cannot distribute what is not earned’. 
Živković replied that the national composition and skills of the work force had improved, 
notwithstanding various negative talks on this topic. He asked for more respect for experts and 
criticised tendentious claims and campaigns to discredit the management of Trepça, especially 
by the provincial trade union.72   
On later occasions, the trade union continued to position itself as the protector of self-
management interests. In June 1969, the union rallied against a proposal for amendments of the 
enterprise’s normative acts. Accordingly, the amendments did not guarantee direct participation 
of working people in management, decision-making, and income distribution and centralised 
self-management functions. Jashari got ‘the impression that we are not all mobilised to bring 
down the income to where it is created’.73 The union again failed to secure sufficient support in 
the Central Workers’ Council.74 In December 1969, the trade union made a dramatic evaluation 
of the performance of the enterprise and added that the management hid behind the financial 
situation in the enterprise to cut short the self-management rights of the workers. This was 
‘proof of the incapability to regulate appropriate relations in production and distribution in the 
enterprise’.75 
 Such calls for accountability for managers increasingly resonated with internal frictions in 
the top management. At a meeting of the sectional directors of Trepça in November 1969, 
representatives of profitable factories criticised that they had to cover the losses that were piling 
up in other factories. They reprimanded directors of loss-making factories for not providing any 
solutions. The division pitted the new generation of technically schooled managers against the 
established political managers. Minir Dushi, one of the first Albanian university-schooled 
engineers and a representative of the former group, was particularly critical and stated that 
‘there have to be limits for tolerating such losses which affect all of us’. Svetozar Ćamilović, a 
typical political manager, who at the time managed the chronically loss-making chemical 
industry factory, declared that the only way out of the crisis in his factory was the introduction 
of provisional receivership. Although this was an unpopular measure, ‘with the existing 
composition of the workforce, with such cadre potential, habits, work discipline, negligence, it 
is impossible to find a way out’.76 A sanitisation programme was introduced,77 but Ćamilović 
himself left Trepça for Belgrade.78  
 
Nationhood at the top management level 
The introduction of obligatory re-elections of managers formalised and politicised competition 
within the top management. In October 1968, the Central Workers’ Council voted for the re-
election of Živković. In line with the new legal prescriptions, the council nominated two 
challengers, the engineers Minir Dushi and Enis Presheva. These were typical representatives 
of the new generation of (Albanian) technically-schooled managers. The selection committee 
ranked Živković first, but the narrow majority of 36 against 31 votes in favour shows the weak 
position of Živković. Amongst those who had voted against Živković were the Albanian 
President of the Workers’ Council Fadilj Mumini and his Deputy Osman Biševac. The 
enterprise newspaper noted that the vote was conducted ‘almost exclusively on a national 
basis’.79 An Albanian top manager who attended the meeting confirmed this in an interview.  
In early 1969, Živković suggested that a Serb engineer would replace Fatmir Agolli, the 
Albanian director of the smelter and refinery factory. It is not clear if this had something to do 
with the dramatic news about the emigration of Serb and Montenegrin cadres. Whatever the 
reason, the workers’ council came out divided on a ‘chauvinist basis’. At the meeting of the 
council, a high representative of the enterprise organisation of the League of Communists even 
openly said that he voted for Agolli because he was Albanian. The Albanian president of the 
council afterwards admitted that he himself had voted for Agolli to stay. He found that the 
political leadership approached this ‘sensitive question’ from their offices chairs 
(‘kancelarijski’) and ‘created chauvinists and nationalists for no reason’. After the meeting, a 
certain Azem Azizi threatened to deal with Agolli and the Serb candidate physically, in order 
to protect Albanian national interests in the enterprise.80 
These instances show that nationhood became a category of practice and vision and division 
at the management level in the late 1960s. Even more significant is the fact that voting patterns 
in workers’ councils were publicly categorised as ‘chauvinist’. Unlike social unrest from below, 
which was depoliticised and denationalised, divisions at the management level were allowed to 
be politicised and nationalised. The particular and explicit national dimension of cadre politics 
implied that the new generation of specialists were overwhelmingly Albanian. In line with the 
focus on skill and qualification in Socialist Yugoslavia’s employment policy, these Albanian 
technically-schooled pioneers were entitled to high-status managerial positions in the 
enterprise. In their upward mobility, they competed with older generations of politically-
appointed managers, who were predominantly Serb and often administratively assigned to 
Trepça. In case of competition for increasingly scarce top cadre positions, it was logical to 
assume that there was discrimination on non-professional, that is, political and national grounds 
(Woodward, 1995, pp. 318–319).   
This process concurred with increasingly open and formalised divisions in the management 
of Yugoslav enterprises, particularly in the re-election procedures for managers. At least in 
Trepça, these were not a mere formality where the workers’ council symbolically and 
unanimously accepted the only candidate, who had been proposed by the Communist decision-
makers. As we have seen above, there were several candidates with different (including 
national) profiles and the outcome of the voting was not set in advance. These pluralist practices 
at the management level explain the politicisation of these national competitions for high-status 
management jobs in Trepça.  
The retrospective nationalisation of the management divisions of the late 1960s in the 
Kosovan League of Communists confirms this finding. Speaking at the Provincial Committee 
of the League of Communists of Kosovo, the leading local Communist of the new generation 
Bahri Oruqi contextualised the strike of 1971 in a broader struggle between progressive self-
management forces and conservative bureaucratic tendencies. Oruqi stated that the former 
management under Živković had led the bureaucratic reaction through informal structures of 
privileged people who hampered the implementation of the cadre politics, and in particular the 
increase of professional cadres from the ranks of the Albanian people. Accordingly, the election 
of new management organs in 1970 had finally broken the power of the old bureaucrats.81 Oruqi 
thus clearly, although within the boundaries of the correct self-management language, made 
sense of the managerial divisions of the late 1960s along national lines (put simplistically, Serb 
bureaucratic conservatism against Albanian technical progress and self-management).82 
This interpretation continues to hold in the collective memory of Trepça. The dominant 
narrative among Albanian engineers and managers is that the economic difficulties of the 1960s 
were only overcome after Albanian specialists were accepted at managerial positions in the 
early 1970s, which initiated a golden era in the history of the enterprise. Serb specialists, on the 
other hand, state that the performance of the enterprise dramatically dropped from the late 
1960s, due to the domination of less qualified Albanian cadres in management positions. Of 
course, the current ethno-political divisions of the enterprise and the city and my status as an 
outsider who is by default expected to be interested in national tensions when it comes to 
Kosovo, determine such a nationalisation of the enterprise’s history. Still, I think the discourse 
goes back to the particular cadre politics in Kosovo in the 1960s, which allowed for the 
politicisation and nationalisation of competition at the top management level, while it 
denationalised and depoliticised potentially national social unrest from below.  
To conclude, I would argue that politically relevant labour divisions in Trepça did not occur 
between the mass of unskilled or semiskilled production workers and management cadres, but 
between political and technical, and, in the particular case of Kosovo, imported Serb and local 
Albanian cadres at the management level. These divisions were allowed to happen in the 
employment and economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia in Kosovo and consolidated in the 
politicised pluralist tendencies in the management culture of Yugoslav enterprises in the late 
1960s. This finding historically substantiates Kolstø’s (2008) hypothesis for the post-Soviet 
space that elite level job competition leads to articulate political elite nationalism, while mass 
level job competition remains non-political.  
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Saving Books], Trepča 13.10.1971, p. 6.  
60. Štrajk kao poraz [Strike As Defeat], Trepča 13.10.1971, p. 6; Gde prestaje logika – počinje štrajk [Where 
Logic Ends, Strike Begins], Trepča 24.11.1971, p. 7.  
 61. AS Đ2 – LCK/2: 24th meeting of the Provincial Committee, 5 March 1971; Zahtevi radnika opravdani – 
metod osuđen [Workers’ Demands Justified, Methods Condemned], Zvečan 20.02.1971, p. 1; Posle obustave 
rada u Topionici sa rafineriom [After the Work Stoppage in the Smelter and Refinery], Trepča, 24.02.1971, pp. 
1–2; Topioničari pitaju [The Smelters Ask], Trepča 17.03.1971, p. 5; Šta pitaju rafinerci [What Do the Refiners 
Ask], Trepča 31.03.1971, p. 5; EMO pita [EMO Asks], Trepča 07.04.1971, p. 7. 
62. Odgovori topioničarima [Answers to the Smelters], Trepča 24.03.1971, pp. 8–9; Šta pitaju rafinerci [What 
Do the Refiners Ask], Trepča 31.03.1971, p. 5.  
63. Topioničari pitaju [The Smelters Ask], Trepča 17.03.1971, p. 5.  
64. Odgovori topioničarima [Answers to the Smelters], Trepča 24.03.1971, pp. 8–9.  
65. AS Đ2 – LCK/2: 24th meeting of the Provincial Committee, 5 March 1971.  
66. RAM/6–1966/1: Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica, Informacija o reizbornosti direktora radnih organizacija 
na području opštine Kosovska Mitrovica [Information on the Re-election of Directors of Work Organisations on 
the Territory of the Municipality of Kosovska Mitrovica] (22 June 1966).  
67. Iz rada radničkog saveta: Jedna burna sednica [From the Work of the Workers’ Council: A Stormy Session], 
Trepča 03.11.1967, p. 5.  
68. Plenum sindikata kombinata Trepča: Oživotvoriti usvojene zaključke [Plenum of the Trepça Trade Union: 
Bringing the Adopted Conclusions to Life], Trepča 29.09.1967, p. 2.  
69. Pokušaj negiranja samoupravljanja [Attempt to Ignore Self-Management], Trepča 21.10.1967, p. 2.  
70. Obračun sa nosiocima intriga [Clash with the Carriers of Intrigues], Trepča 03.11.1967, p. 1. 
71. Svi na svoje zadatke: Sa razgovora o stanju i problemima Trepče [All to Their Tasks: From the Talk on the 
Situation and Problems of Trepça], Zvečan 22.11.1967, p. 2; Jedinstvo u borbi za reforme [Unity in the Battle for 
Reforms], Trepča 09.12.1967, pp. 25–27. 
72. Jedinstvo u borbi za reforme [Unity in the Battle for Reforms], Trepča 09.12.1967, pp. 25–7. 
73. Sindikat protiv predloga statute [Trade Union Against the Draft Statute], Trepča 09.05.1969, p. 3.  
74. Poverenje – ko kome [Who Trusts Who], Trepča 09.06.1969, p. 1; Putem – mimo samoupravljanja [Outside 
Self-Management], Trepča 29.07.1969, p. 9.  
75. Iz preduzetnog odbora sindikata [ From the Enterprise Council of the Trade Union], Trepča 07.01.1970, p. 5.  
76. Dokle tolerisati gubitke pojedinih pogona [How Far Tolerate Losses of Certain Factories], Trepča 
12.11.1969, pp. 1–2.  
77. Borba za sanaciju u hemijskoj industriji [Battle for Sanitation in Chemical Industry], Trepča 11.02.1970, p. 
1, p. 4. 
78. Za kim zvone zvona [For Whom Do the Bells Ring], Trepča 05.05.1972, p. 9.  
79. Jedna dinamična sednica radničkog saveta preduzeća: Časlav Živković ponovo generalni direktor [Dynamic 
Session of the Enterprise’s Workers’ Council: Časlav Živković Again General Director], Trepča 25.10.1968, pp. 
1–2. 
80. Oživotvoranje zaključaka Preduzetne konferencije SK [Bringing the Conclusions of the Enterprise 
Conference of the LC to Life], Trepča 22.04.1969, pp. 1–5.  
81. AS Đ2 – LCK/2: 24th meeting of the Provincial Committee, 5 March 1971.  
82. In practice, it was the bureaucratic political elite that regained dominance in the enterprise and society as a 
whole in the 1970s. In Kosovo, a new generation of Albanian leaders of the League of Communists gained the 
upper hand in the party and benefited from the reaffirmation of stricter party control. During the 1970s, directors 
of Trepça were political functionaries. Ironically, as Oruqi proclaimed the victory of self-management in 1970, 
the first Albanian general director of Trepça, Veli Deva, was a political functionary. Oruqi himself was one of 
the political managers of Trepça during the 1970s.  
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